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While academic scholarship generally offers various forms of commentary on decided cases, 
feminist judgment-writing projects have recently embarked on a new form of critical 
scholarship. Rather than critiquing judgments from a feminist perspective in academic 
essays, the participants in these projects have set out instead to write alternative 
judgments, as if they had been one of the judges sitting on the court at the time. After 
introducing the UK Feminist Judgments Project and describing what is ‘different’ about the 
judgments it has produced, the paper explains some of the ways in which these judgments 
have been used as teaching resources in UK law schools. The paper goes on to introduce the 
following four articles in this issue of the Law Teacher, which illustrate in greater detail 
particular pedagogical uses of the Feminist Judgments Project. 
 
Introduction 
This issue of the Law Teacher features a series of articles discussing experiences, proposals 
and possibilities for using feminist judgments in the classroom. These articles draw upon the 
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feminist judgment-writing projects which have recently embarked on a new form of critical 
scholarship. Rather than critiquing judgments from a feminist perspective in academic 
essays, the participants in these projects have set out instead to write alternative 
judgments, as if they had been one of the judges sitting on the court at the time. This 
involves putting feminist theory into practice in judgment form, under conditions of 
constraint such as using only the law and materials available at the time of the original 
judgment, responding to arguments put by the opposing parties, and observing judicial 
norms of fairness, impartiality, and respect for precedent.1 The aim is to show that, even at 
the time of the original decision, the case could have been reasoned and/or decided 
differently. 
Of course feminist judgments need not be imagined. There are many actual feminist 
appellate judgments issued by judges such as Lady Hale on the UK Supreme Court, Madame 
Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé on the Canadian Supreme Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
in the US Supreme Court and Justice Mary Gaudron on the High Court of Australia, to name 
only a few. Judgments identifiable as feminist may also be authored by male judges.2 What 
                                                          
1
 For discussion of the effect of these constraints and the limits they impose on the critical project of feminist 
judgment-writing, see Diana Majury, ‘Introducing the Women’s Court of Canada’ (2006) 18 Canadian Journal 
of Women and the Law 1 at 6; Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley, ‘Feminist Judgments: An 
Introduction’, in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to 
Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 3 at 5-6, 13-15; Rosemary Hunter, ‘An Account of Feminist Judging’, in 
Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 30. 
2
 The question of what counts as a feminist judgment and how feminist judgments may be identified is a 
contentious one which, while falling outside the scope of this paper, has been discussed at length elsewhere. 
See, e.g. Elizabeth Sheehy (ed), Adding Feminist to Law: The Contributions of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004); Rosemary Hunter, ‘Can Feminist Judges Make a Difference?’ (2008) 15 
International Journal of the Legal Profession 7; Beverley Baines, ‘But Was She a Feminist Judge?’ in Kim Brooks 
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the feminist judgment-writing projects offer, however, is a concentrated collection of 
feminist judgments which announce their own strategies and critical objectives and which 
aim to be accessible, and which may thus be drawn upon readily by legal educators and 
students in teaching and learning. 
The following discussion first introduces the UK Feminist Judgments Project and 
describes what is ‘different’ about the judgments the Project has produced, before going on 
to explain some of the ways in which these judgments have been used as teaching resources 
in law schools, and to introduce the next three articles, which provide more detailed 
illustrations of these uses. It finally introduces the last article in the section, which provides 
a theoretical account of the critical contribution feminist judgments may make to the 
current research-led-teaching agenda. 
 
The UK Feminist Judgments Project 
The idea of writing imagined feminist judgments was first conceived by a group of Canadian 
feminist academics, lawyers and activists who were particularly concerned with the 
development of the Canadian Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on s.15 – the equality clause – 
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As members of the Women’s Legal 
Education and Action Fund (LEAF), they had been involved in a number of interventions in 
s.15 cases, in which LEAF had submitted briefs urging the Court to implement a more robust 
conception of substantive equality. Although the Court had initially been responsive to their 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(ed), Justice Bertha Wilson: One Woman’s Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009) 211; Beverley Baines, 
‘Feminist Judges, Feminist Adjudication and Feminist Legal Scholars’, in Ulrike Shultz and Gisela Shaw (eds), 
Gender and Judging (Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2012). See also the section on ‘What’s Different 
About Feminist Judgments?’ below. 
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arguments, over time those arguments appeared to be having less and less impact, and they 
were searching for new ways to capture the Court’s attention. In Majury’s words: 
 
Women’s equality is painfully far from being a reality—too many women live in 
poverty, unable to feed and house themselves and their children adequately; 
lesbians are merely tolerated, mostly regarded as a deviant lifestyle, sometimes 
targeted for hate and violence; women with disabilities are still denied basic access 
to transportation, employment, and autonomy; racialized women are stigmatized 
and marginalized, and, in the post 9/11 political climate, some are perceived as 
potential terrorists; Aboriginal women are disappearing—raped, murdered, and 
discarded. The issues are urgent; there is much equality work to be done. But, 
politicians and Supreme Court of Canada judges alike seem to think that women 
have largely attained equality and that other issues (balanced budgets and national 
security) should take priority over equality. We are losing equality ground; we are in 
danger of losing our equality footing.3  
 
It was in this context that they hit upon the idea of rewriting s.15 cases in order to 
demonstrate to the Court how it could be done. They dubbed themselves the Women’s 
Court of Canada (WCC), and set about ‘reviewing’ Supreme Court decisions on s.15. The first 
six decisions of the WCC were published in the Canadian Journal of Women and the Law in 
March 2008.4 One of the activities of the WCC from early on was to introduce law students 
to their judgments and encourage students to consider the reasoning they had employed 
                                                          
3
 Majury, op. cit. n 1 at 1. 
4
 The judgments are available at: http://womenscourt.ca/. 
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and to compare and contrast the judgments of the WCC with the decisions of the Supreme 
Court. The WCC launch event included a one-day symposium incorporating student 
workshops at the University of Toronto, and the WCC subsequently went ‘on the road’ to 
speak to students at the Universities of Victoria and Saskatchewan in Western Canada.5 
Members of the WCC have subsequently published an article on the pedagogical use of WCC 
judgments.6 
While the WCC focused on a distinct body of jurisprudence, the UK Feminist 
Judgments Project, launched in late 2007, took a broader approach to its subject-matter, 
issuing a general invitation to feminist legal academics to write alternative feminist 
judgments in any area of English law. Participants were both self-selected and selected their 
own judgments to rewrite, inevitably choosing cases in which they perceived a particular 
gender issue to arise, and/or an injustice that they wished to remedy. The result was the 
production of 23 alternative judgments across a wide range of areas – family law, criminal 
law, public law, contract, property law, banking law, equality and human rights law. In a 
handful of cases the judgment-writer imagined an appeal to a higher court and wrote a 
fictional appeal judgment. However, the majority were written as additional judgments in 
the original case decided by the Court of Appeal, House of Lords or Privy Council. 
Interestingly, not all of these were dissenting judgments. Several were concurrences, in 
which the feminist judgment-writer agreed with the result in the case, but did so for 
different reasons. The judgments have been published in a book: Feminist Judgments: From 
                                                          
5
 See http://womenscourt.ca/media. 
6
 Jennifer Koshan, with Diana Majury, Carissima Mathen, Megan Evans Maxwell and Denise Reaume, 
‘Rewriting Equality: The Pedagogical Use of Women’s Court of Canada Judgments’ (2010) 4 Canadian Legal 
Education Annual Review 121. 
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Theory to Practice.7 In the book, each judgment is accompanied by a commentary, which 
explains for the benefit of the non-specialist reader the facts and the issues in the original 
case, how it was originally decided, and what the feminist judgment does differently. The 
book also contains an introduction to the Project and two theoretical chapters on the 
practice of feminist judging and the judgment-writing process. 
 
What’s Different about Feminist Judgments? 
The feminist judgments differ from their originals in a variety of ways, both substantive and 
methodological. Substantively, the judgments implicitly draw upon various aspects of 
feminist legal theory, particularly feminist critiques of liberal legalism. So, for example, 
several of the judgments view the subjects of law as relational and interdependent rather 
than as atomised, self-interested and competitive individuals,8 and seek to implement an 
‘ethic of care’ rather than the more traditional, masculine ‘hierarchy of rights’.9 Similarly, 
some reject the liberal dichotomy which sees subjects either as autonomous agents or as 
vulnerable victims in need of protection, and assert the possibility of occupying positions of 
both autonomy and vulnerability, victim and agent, at the same time – a common feature of 
                                                          
7
 Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
8
 See, e.g. Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Reconceiving Autonomy’ (1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 7; Jennifer 
Nedelsky, ‘Law, Boundaries and the Bounded Self’ (1990) 30 Representations 162; Martha Albertson Fineman, 
The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency (New York: New Press, 2004). 
9
 See, e.g. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1982); Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care 
(New York: Routledge, 1993); Robin West, Caring for Justice (New York: New York University Press, 1997); 
Selma Sevenhuijsen, Citizenship and the Ethics of Care: Feminist Considerations on Justice, Morality and Politics 
(London: Routledge, 1998). 
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women’s lives.10 Others tackle the public/private distinction, and challenge the state’s 
refusal to limit the power of those who control the private sphere from engaging in abuse, 
exploitation and exclusion.11 Others rethink problems of ‘clashing rights’12  and bring a 
different perspective to bear on these dilemmas which often involves showing how differing 
rights and interests which were assumed to be incompatible can actually be mutually 
accommodated. And some, like the Women’s Court of Canada, advocate a more substantive 
interpretation of ‘equality’, while others continue to appreciate the value of formal equality 
arguments in circumstances where even this basic standard of equal treatment is lacking.  
Another group of judgments draw upon Foucauldian critiques of medical or bio-
power13 to question the privileging of ‘expert’ medical or welfare opinions, and the 
                                                          
10
 See, e.g. Ann Scales, ‘The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay’ (1986) 95 Yale Law Journal 1373; 
Rosemary Hunter, ‘Consent in Violent Relationships’, in Rosemary Hunter and Sharon Cowan (eds), Choice and 
Consent: Feminist Engagements with Law and Subjectivity (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007) 158; Martha Albertson 
Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition’ (2008) 20 Yale Journal of Law 
and Feminism 1. 
11
 See, e.g. Frances Olsen, ‘The Myth of State Intervention in the Family’ (1984) 18 University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform 835; Katherine O’Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1985); Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Martha Albertson 
Fineman and Roxanne Mykitiuk (eds), The Public Nature of Private Violence: The Discovery of Domestic Abuse 
(New York: Routledge, 1994); Margaret Thornton, Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press, 1995); Susan B. Boyd, Challenging the Public/Private Divide: Feminism, Law and Public 
Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997). 
12
 See, e.g. Elizabeth Kingdom, What’s Wrong with Rights? Problems for Feminist Politics of Law (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1992); Aileen McColgan, Women Under the Law: The False Promise of Human 
Rights (Harlow: Longman, 2000). 
13
 See, e.g. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Tavistock, 
1970); Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007); Peter Miller and Nikolas Rose (eds), The Power of Psychiatry (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986); 
Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989); Katherine O’Donovan, ‘Law’s 
Knowledge: The Judge, the Expert, the Battered Woman and Her Syndrome’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law and 
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associated devaluation of the knowledge and experience of parents and carers, or the need 
for women to produce ‘expert’ medical or psychiatric evidence to prove they have been 
harmed. The judgments also evidence the feminist theoretical concern with intersectionality 
– i.e. the need to acknowledge that women do not all share the same essential life 
experience, but that gender intersects with class, race, ethnicity, religion, sexuality and so 
on in different ways.14 Thus, the judgments deal with the specific positions and experiences 
of older women, lesbians, and Muslim women in particular cultural contexts. 
Methodologically, the feminist judgments consistently use a set of techniques which 
are fairly distinctive, and which have also been identified in other literature on feminist 
judging.15 First is the technique of telling the story differently, i.e. recounting the facts of the 
case in a different way from the original judgments in order to give voice to those (often 
women) who have been silenced or sidelined. Second is the use of contextual materials – 
social science, historical, and policy literature – to place the facts and the legal issues in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Society 427; Nikolas Rose, Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
14
 See, e.g. Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics’ (1989) University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 139; Kimberlé W. Crenshaw, ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color’ (1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241; Emily Grabham, Davina Cooper, Jane 
Krishnadas and Didi Herman (eds), Intersectionality and Beyond: Law, Power and the Politics of Location 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); Helma Lutz, Maria Teresa Herrera Vivar and Linda Supik (eds), Framing 
Intersectionality: Debates on a Multi-faceted Concept in Gender Studies (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011). 
15
 See, e.g. Judith Resnik, ‘On the Bias: Reconsideration of the Aspirations for our Judges’ (1988) 61 Southern 
California Law Review 1877; Katherine T. Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) 103 Harvard Law Review 
829; Sharon E. Rush, ‘Feminist Judging: An Introductory Essay’ (1993) 2 Southern California Review of Law and 
Women’s Studies 609; Sheehy, op. cit. n 2; Hunter, op. cit. n 1, op. cit. n 2; Koshan et al., op. cit. n 6. Though it 
should also be stressed that there is no fixed ‘programme’ for feminist judging, and that a feminist approach to 
judging might not differ greatly from any other critically aware judicial approach (see Hunter, op. cit. n 1 at 43). 
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broader context. For example the feminist judgments variously include reference to 
research evidence on rape trials, domestic violence, lesbian motherhood, post-separation 
parenting, ageing, sado-masochistic sexual preferences, and the dynamics of commercial 
relationships. In addition, the judgments incorporate what I have identified as ‘feminist 
common knowledge’, i.e. information about the world that feminists consider to be so well 
known that it does not require proof.16 So, for example, the feminist judgments draw on 
common knowledge about caring, marriage, parenthood, pregnancy, homophobia, and the 
intricacies of negotiating ethnic minority cultural and religious identities within 
contemporary British society. The use of social science research evidence and feminist 
common knowledge in turn enables the judge to engage in what Katherine Bartlett calls 
‘feminist practical reasoning’,17 i.e. reasoning from context rather than in the abstract, 
leading to more particularised – and arguably therefore more just – results. Such reasoning 
can be used to highlight the shortcomings of the current law, to show why a particular rule 
is inappropriate or inapplicable to the given facts, and/or to incorporate previously excluded 
experiences and perspectives into the stock of legal knowledge, which then become 
available to future judges, lawyers and litigants.  
 
Feminist Judgments as Teaching Resources 
                                                          
16
 For a fuller discussion of ‘feminist common knowledge’, and how it relates to the doctrine of judicial notice, 
see Hunter, op. cit. n 1 at 38-39; Rosemary Hunter, ‘Justice Marcia Neave: Case Study of a Feminist Judge’, in 
Ulrike Schultz and Gisela Shaw (eds), Gender and Judging (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) forthcoming. On the 
sources of judicial knowledge, see also Regina Graycar, ‘The Gender of Judgments: An Introduction’, in 
Margaret Thornton (ed), Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1995) 262. 
17
 Bartlett, op. cit. n 15. 
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It quickly became obvious to those who participated in the project, and those who read the 
book, that the feminist judgments made excellent teaching resources. They did so in three 
respects. First, they demonstrated how feminist theoretical ideas could be implemented in 
legal practice. For students who were curious as to how this could be done, or who were 
sceptical as to whether it could be done, they provided practical illustrations. Some students 
who expected that judgments written from a feminist perspective would be biased or 
incoherent were forced to rethink their preconceptions. For example in the case of 
Wilkinson v Kitzinger,18 a lesbian couple who had been married in Canada sought to have 
their marriage recognised as a marriage in England, whereas English law recognised it only 
as a civil partnership. They argued that this refusal violated their rights under Articles 8, 12 
and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The President of the Family 
Division, Sir Mark Potter, dismissed their application and advanced a vehement defence of 
the value of ‘traditional’ heterosexual marriage, the protection of which was said to justify 
interference with the applicants’ rights to non-discrimination under Article 14 ECHR. The 
feminist judgment (one of the fictional appeals) meticulously examines the legal precedents 
on the ECHR, exposes flaws in the judge’s reasoning on Articles 12 and 14, and finds in 
favour of the applicants.19 Students comparing the two judgments found that it was the 
feminist judgment that appeared neutral, dispassionate, ‘legal’ and ‘objective’, while the 
original judgment was more emotional, partial and overdetermined.  
In addition, the feminist judgments collectively demonstrate that feminism is not 
monolithic – that there may be a variety of feminist views on a particular issue, and that it is 
                                                          
18
 Wilkinson v Kitzinger [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam); [2007] 1 FLR 295. 
19
 Rosie Harding, ‘Wilkinson v Kitzinger – Judgment’, in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley 
(eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2010) 430. 
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not possible simply to ‘read off’ ‘the’ feminist outcome from the facts. For example, some of 
the imagined feminist judgments rewrote decisions of Baroness Hale, illustrating a different 
feminist perspective on issues such as the scope of the defence of provocation, the relative 
importance of biological versus social motherhood, or whether schoolgirls should be 
allowed their choice to wear strict Islamic dress. 
Secondly, the feminist judgments can be used to provoke critical thinking about 
judicial decision-making by exposing the contingency of the decisions made. Results that 
appeared inevitable are shown not to be so.20 As Majury states in the Canadian context: 
 
The WCC decision enabled the students to see concretely that the decision really 
could have been written and decided very differently... While the students may 
already have understood this in the abstract, it seemed that reading the rewritten 
judgment helped them to see and understand that potential at a deeper and more 
meaningful level. It became a possibility rather than just an idea.21  
 
The judgments can also be used to highlight the techniques of persuasion judges 
employ, and the choices judges make in constructing the ‘facts’ of the case, hence 
demonstrating that the ‘facts’ represented by the court are indeed selected and constructed 
rather than transparently reflecting an external reality.22 Following on from this, the 
judgments provoke reflection on the important relationship between the story told about 
the facts and the outcome of the case.  
                                                          
20
 See also Koshan et al., op. cit. n 6 at 137, 139. 
21
 See also Koshan et al., ibid at 136-137. 
22
 See also Koshan et al., ibid at 130, 138, 142. 
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Thirdly, the feminist judgments can be used to provoke critical thinking about the 
particular decision made by the court and to illustrate different possibilities for the 
development of legal doctrine in the relevant subject areas. The judgments suggest new 
directions for the development of the common law in relation to property, contracts, 
criminal liability and defences, child welfare and the application of international law by 
domestic courts, among others. They also offer alternative interpretations of legislative 
provisions in human rights law, criminal law, evidence law and employment protection law. 
In some instances, too, they illustrate the limits of the law and its inability to provide a 
remedy. In the case of James v Eastleigh Borough Council,23 the feminist judge reluctantly 
concludes that an interpretation of the concept of discrimination in the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 which she might have preferred is simply not open for a judge to make.24  And the 
incapacity of judicial review proceedings to regulate potential future conflicts, as opposed to 
adjudicating retrospectively on past events, is clearly identified in the feminist judgment in R 
v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex parte Glass.25 
The feminist judgments are now being used for teaching purposes in a number of 
English law schools (and internationally), in ‘gender and law’-type courses (focusing on 
feminist approaches to judging);26 in introduction to law, jurisprudence and statutory 
interpretation courses (focusing on critical analysis of judicial decision-making); and in 
                                                          
23
 James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751. 
24
 Aileen McColgan, ‘James v Eastleigh Borough Council – Judgment’, in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and 
Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 420. 
25
 R v Portsmouth Hospitals NHS Trust, ex parte Glass [1999] 2 FLR 95 (CA); Jo Bridgeman, ‘R v Portsmouth 
Hospitals NHS Trust, ex parte Glass – Judgment’, in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), 
Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 369. 
26
 See also Koshan et al., op. cit. n 6 at 132-136. 
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doctrinal courses such as family law, criminal law, civil liberties, law and commercial 
relationships, and healthcare ethics (focusing on how particular cases might have been 
decided differently, and more generally on alternative possibilities for doctrinal 
development).27 In some of these courses, students are required to draft their own feminist 
judgment as part of the assessment, or have the option of doing so. 
Two of the participants in the project successfully applied to the UK Centre for Legal 
Education for a grant to develop a set of teaching materials based on the Feminist 
Judgments Project.  The grant enabled them to hold two workshops at which academics 
who were using the judgments in teaching, or were interested in doing so, could discuss 
with each other and share ideas about how they were using the judgments, how they had 
designed their classes, and their experiences of teaching with the judgments. Subsequently, 
some of those who attended the workshops wrote up their teaching materials, and these 
are now publicly available on the Feminist Judgments website.28 The following discussion 
draws upon and presents (in edited form) some of these teaching materials. 
 
Specific Examples 
Two of the sets of materials use the feminist judgments as a vehicle for critical analysis of 
judgment-writing and judicial reasoning.  One of these, produced by Anna Grear for a course 
on critical and legal reasoning, is discussed in depth in Grear’s paper in this issue.  The other 
set, produced by Lois Bibbings, is summarised here: 
 
Lois Bibbings, University of Bristol  
                                                          
27
 See also Koshan et al., ibid at 129-132, 136-137. 
28
 At http://www.feministjudgments.org.uk. 
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 Module: Legal Methods 
 Aims: To enable critical discussion of legal methods, including the construction 
of legal argument, the use of precedent and, in particular, techniques of judging.  
 Reading: Court of Appeal judgment in R v Stone and Dobinson;29 feminist 
judgment in R v Stone and Dobinson;30 theoretical material on precedent and 
judging. 
 Questions/Exercise: The focus of the class should be on the discussion and 
analysis of the two versions of the judgment in R v Stone and Dobinson. 
Attention should be directed first to the ‘real’ case: how it is argued, how it uses 
precedent, how convincing its reasoning and decision are and why? An analysis 
of the alternative judgment should follow, along similar lines and then a 
comparative discussion can be introduced. Amongst other things, students 
should be encouraged to think how precedent and the techniques of judging are 
used in each case, which they think is the most lawyerly/legalistic and which is 
the most convincing decision and why. Students could also be asked to reflect 
upon the nature of legal reasoning and judging, taking into account different 
                                                          
29
 R v Stone and Dobinson [1977] QB 354 (CA). The case concerns criminal liability for omissions. The court 
upheld manslaughter convictions for both defendants, on the basis that they had assumed a duty to care for 
the first defendant’s seriously ill sister, and had breached that duty, resulting in her death. 
30
 Lois Bibbings, ‘R v Stone and Dobinson – Judgment’, in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley 
(eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 234. The feminist judgment 
revisits the facts of the case, acknowledging the difficulties experienced by the defendants who themselves 
suffered from significant disabilities and their unsuccessful attempts to get help for the deceased, and 
attributing blame not to the defendants but to the wider community and the state for their failures to care for 
the family as a whole. 
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accounts of what is, might or should be involved (e.g. objectivity, rationality, 
logic, craft, creativity, emotion, politics, standpoint, empathy). 
 
Two other sets of materials focus on feminism and the application of feminist theory 
to legal decision-making, while also thinking about techniques of judging.  Again, one of 
these, produced by Caroline Hunter and Ben Fitzpatrick, is discussed in depth in their paper 
in this issue.  It is notable that in their ‘Foundational Issues in Law’ module, Hunter and 
Fitzpatrick use an actual rather than imagined feminist judgment – an opinion delivered by 
Lady Hale when she was a member of the Court of Appeal, which is contrasted with the 
judgment of one of her male colleagues in the same case. The other set of materials, 
produced by Joanne Conaghan, uses Susan Edwards’ feminist judgment in the case of 
Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley.31  
 
Joanne Conaghan, University of Kent  
 Module: Critical Introduction to Law  
 Aims: understand feminism as a critical ‘mode of analysis or way of seeing’; 
consider the application of that way of seeing to a particular case; analyse how 
                                                          
31
 Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23; [2005] 2 AC 580; Susan Edwards, ‘Attorney-General for 
Jersey v Holley – Judgment’, in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist Judgments: 
From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 297. The case concerned the legal test for the 
availability of the defence of provocation. While a majority of the Privy Council held that the provocation must 
be such that it could cause an ordinary person to lose self control, the feminist judgment prefers the 
alternative formulation, that the provocation could make a person with the defendant’s characteristics 
(including any physical or mental conditions) lose self-control, on the basis that this formulation is necessary in 
order to do justice to battered women who kill their abusers. 
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the feminist judgment operates, and its similarities and differences from the 
original judgments; critically assess the feminist claim to produce ‘fairer trials’. 
 Reading: Privy Council decision in Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley; feminist 
judgment in Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley. 
 Questions: Privy Council decision: What was the legal issue which Holley seeks to 
resolve? What are the facts? How do you know? Consider the majority and 
minority judgments: (a) What arguments do they put forward? (b) What 
techniques of statutory interpretation do they deploy? (c) Does story 
telling/narrative play a role in any of the judgments? What is the relevance of 
justice to decision-making in Holley? Feminist judgment: In what sense is this a 
‘feminist’ judgement? Does it work? Does the inclusion of gender considerations 
lead to more just judicial reasoning? Is the author’s advocacy of a flexible 
standard for judging self-control consistent with her view that male jealousy and 
hubris should always be ruled out as a ground for provocation? Does it matter? 
 
The final set of materials addresses all three issues: the nature of judgment-writing, 
the application of feminist legal theory and different ways in which legal doctrine could have 
developed. The author presents a generic teaching plan for introducing feminist judgments 
in the classroom, which she suggests could be applied to a range of possible modules 
including Public Law, Legal Method, Law and Gender, Human Rights, Legal Theory or a 
Project-based course. 
 
Harriet Samuels, University of Westminster 
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 Aims: Understand and experience the process of judgment-writing; Develop an 
understanding of the historical, social, and economic context of judgments; 
Understand and apply feminist method. 
 Reading: First instance, Court of Appeal and House of Lords decisions in Roberts 
v Hopwood;32 feminist judgment in Roberts v Hopwood and accompanying 
commentary;33 Short v Poole Corporation,34 or any two contemporaneous cases 
that raise relevant issues. (Samuels also includes a reading list for the teacher, 
covering women and the law, feminist methods, judicial decision-making, 
judicial politics, women judges, and feminist judging.) 
 Exercise: Introduce the first case; Consider the case in its historical, social, 
economic and political context as appropriate; Study feminist method and 
feminist judgment-writing; Re-write another case using feminist method. 
Class 1. Discuss thinking critically, feminist method, historical context; assign 
case reading and questions to prepare.  
                                                          
32
 In Roberts v Hopwood [1925] AC 578, the district auditor disallowed Poplar Borough Council’s decision to 
pay a higher minimum wage to its employees than had been agreed through official trade union negotiations, 
and to pay the same wage to women and men, on the grounds that the proposed pay was excessive, 
unreasonable, amounted to gratuities rather than wages, and failed to take into account the interests of the 
ratepayers. The Council sought judicial review of the auditor’s decision, but the decision was upheld by the 
House of Lords. 
33
 Harriet Samuels, ‘Roberts v Hopwood – Judgment’, in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley 
(eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 387; Stephanie Palmer, 
‘Commentary on Roberts v Hopwood’, in Rosemary Hunter, Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley (eds), Feminist 
Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 381. The feminist judgment draws on 
contemporary material to demonstrate that equal pay for women should not have been considered 
unreasonable. 
34
 Short v Poole Corporation [1926] Ch 66 (CA). 
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Class 2. Discuss the case: facts, arguments, legal issues, majority and dissenting 
judgments, judicial preferences/partiality/values; discuss the feminist judgment: 
how does it apply feminist method? Compare and contrast the majority and 
feminist judgments.  
Class 3. Prepare students to write a feminist/alternative judgment in the second 
case: summarise facts, summarise arguments, conclusions, reasons, reasons for 
rejecting the other side’s arguments; reflection on values, gender issues, wider 
context. 
Judgments may be written in next class or in students’ own time. 
 
 Rosemary Auchmuty’s paper in this issue describes a new, upper level core module, 
‘Property Law Project’, which similarly combines consideration of the nature of judgment-
writing, the application of feminist legal theory and different ways in which legal doctrine 
could have developed. Auchmuty identifies three obstacles to using feminist judgments in 
the classroom: that they are judgments (which students have grown out of the habit of 
reading), that they are feminist (which students tend to dismiss or resist), and that they are 
subject-specific (requiring some depth of knowledge to understand them). She goes on to 
describe how the ‘Property Law Project’ seeks to overcome these obstacles, by requiring 
students to write their own judgment as part of the assessment in the module, and to use 
Feminist Judgments as a primer in doing so.  
 
Conclusion: Critical Projects in Teaching and Learning 
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It can be seen that the teaching approaches developed from the Feminist Judgments Project 
mostly seek to engage students in discussion, debate and practical exercises, although the 
feminist judgments can clearly also be incorporated into lectures – for example on the 
Feminist Judgments website Conaghan provides powerpoint slides for a lecture on feminist 
judging and the case of Attorney-General for Jersey v Holley to precede the seminar exercise 
set out above. The approaches are also evidently focused on critical thinking about law, 
emphasising various ways in which law may be questioned rather than taken for granted, 
evaluated rather than simply learnt, and considering how a critical, feminist approach may 
be brought to bear, while also being concerned to take a critical, questioning stance in 
relation to the feminist project itself.  As Réaume notes of her experience of teaching a 
seminar dedicated to a sustained analysis of the WCC judgments and their originals: 
 
While the students appreciated the different approach that the WCC brought to the 
cases, they did not passively go along with the new approach. Having opened up 
what made a WCC decision different, the students often noticed gaps or flaws in the 
reasoning of both courts. This sometimes led to reflection on how the gaps could be 
filled, on how the argument really should go.35  
 
Although judgments embodying other critical theories are less readily available, the 
feminist judgments and related teaching materials could also clearly be used to illustrate 
ways in which other critical approaches (such as critical legal studies, critical race theory or 
                                                          
35
 Koshan et al., op. cit. n 6 at 139. 
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decolonising jurisprudence) could be incorporated into judgments, and/or to encourage 
students to write alternative judgments employing these approaches.   
In their article on the use of WCC judgments in teaching, Koshan et al. connect their 
project firmly with ‘outsider pedagogy’, i.e. the conscious inclusion of the experiences and 
perspectives of ‘outsider’ groups within (legal) education in order both to remedy past 
exclusions and to challenge the claims to neutrality and objectivity of traditionally accepted 
and authoritative ways of seeing and understanding the world.  For example, they argue 
that “Including feminist perspectives in legal education...seeks to ensure that women’s 
voices have ‘space...credibility, and perhaps even power’”.36 They further argue that it is 
necessary for law students to be exposed to multiple social realities and to become aware of 
“multidimensional sources and forms of, as well as solutions to, inequality”, in order to 
“properly serve their clients and be strong social citizens”.37  I would suggest, however, that 
while some teachers will want to use the feminist judgments as part of a political project of 
feminist, critical or ‘outsider’ pedagogy – as Rosemary Auchmuty’s paper illustrates – the 
judgments may also be used by those who are concerned to teach students to interrogate 
the nature of legal reasoning and the development of legal doctrine, but may not share 
these broader political goals. 
Nevertheless, in their concluding article on ‘Research Led Teaching, Vehicular Ideas 
and the Feminist Judgments Project’, Carr and Dearden argue that a commitment to 
promoting critical thinking on the part of students is an essential element of the use of 
                                                          
36
 Koshan et al., ibid at 124, quoting Natasha Bakht, Kim Brooks, Gillian Calder and Jennifer Koshan, ‘”Counting 
Outsiders”: A Critical Exploration of Outsider Course Enrollment in Canadian Legal Education’ (2007) 45 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 667 at 674. 
37
 Koshan et al., ibid at 125; see also pp. 138, 143-144. 
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feminist judgments in the classroom.  Stepping back from detailed teaching strategies to a 
broader consideration of the concept of research led teaching (RLT) and the role it has 
played within higher education policy agendas, Carr and Dearden observe that using 
feminist judgments as teaching resources provides a useful example of RLT.  But they also 
warn of the risk of RLT being deployed in a depoliticised form which merely plays into 
dominant neo-liberal norms.  By contrast, by consciously offering both a critical approach 
and a collaborative dialogue between researchers and teachers, the Feminist Judgments 
Project and the teaching materials developed from it can assist in avoiding this result.   
